Scarcely thirty years ago, three small groups of engineers in Japan, Switzerland and the United States completely reinvented the wristwatch with all new electronic components.
For five hundred years, the watch had been mechanical, with a gear train powered by an unwinding spring. In the early 1970s it seemed unlikely that electronic watches would sell in large quantities. But today, when about 90 per cent of all watches made are electronic, a few craftsmen produce a small number of high-end mechanical pieces a year. Electronic wristwatches come in an enormous range of styles, some with analog dials and others with digital displays, and serve every whim and purpose. Battery-powered electronic wristwatches now give everyone, whether they need it or not, access to the split-second accuracy once available only to scientists and technicians.
The history of the electronic watch is worth a closer look. Its development during the 1960s was in the vanguard of a dramatic shift from a mechanical to an electronic world. T h e wristwatch was one of the first consumer products to make the transition, just as at the beginning of the nineteenth century, clocks were among the first consumer products made in factories by machine. A comprehensive history of consumer electronics has yet to y be written, and the case of the electronic watch may suggest avenues of enquiry about how established industries and consumers interacted as electronics entered the market in the late 4 I twentieth century.'
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1 How the watch industry reacted to electronics and how consumers reacted to electronic watches suggest questions for further research in other areas of the history of consumer electronics, where no comprehensive history has been written. For specific aspects see, for example, Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddeson, Crystal Historically, clocks and watches of all sorts lie at an important crossroads of science, technology and society. Changes in timekeeping technology have influenced the character of scientific observation, aided the development of other machine technologies and brought significant revisions in the way people think about and behave in time. In contributing to the creation of time discipline and the abandonment of temporal cues from the natural world, the invention of the mechanical clock around AD 1300, for example, was one of the key points in turning Western civilization towards modernity.2 Today, the ubiquity of electronic watches that display time's passage in hundredths of a second suggests that at least some people have devised specialized new uses for such tiny fragments of precise time, but the enduring importance of these new timekeepers for our relationship to time is still largely undocumented.
As significant as clocks and watches are, for most of horological history the details do not survive about how and why new technologies appeared. Nobody knows, for example, who invented the mechanical clock. Likewise, nobody knows who invented the mechanical watch about AD 1450, or even the modern wristwatch as the twentieth century turned. The first mechanical clocks were large weight-driven machines for public places. The key invention that enabled the gear train of such a machine to keep regular time was the escapement. T o make portable timekeepers, such as domestic clocks or watches worn on the body, anonymous inventors in the early fifteenth century miniaturized the gear train and substituted the force of an unwinding spring for that of falling weights. T h e modern mechanical wristwatch was less a new invention than an adaptation. At the end of the nineteenth century, as accessories for sports like archery and cycling, women wore small watch movements -originally designed to be worn on a neck chain or lapel pin -in leather straps attached around their wrists. The electronic wristwatch involved inventing anew the internal components, methods for displaying time and manufacturing technique^.^ In addition, most published histories of timekeeping focus on improvements to Washington, DC and London, 1986, 218-16, 233-4 London, 1962, 119-28 ; Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, New York, 1934 and 1963, 12-18 Mechanical Engineering, New York, 1963, 142; D. S. L. Cardwell, Turning Points in Western Technology, New York, 1972, 18-19. 3 There exists a vast literature on clocks, watches and the internal technical history of improvements in timekeeping, much of which is written by and for collectors. Useful references on late twentieth-century timekeepers are Frederick J. Britten, Britten's Watch and Clockmakers' Handbook, Dictionary and Guide, 16th ed., (rev. and ed. Richard Good), London, 1978, 25844; and Pieter Doensen, Watch: History of Modern Wristtu~tch Design, Ghent, 1994. mechanical clocks and watches, and give scant attention to most of the twentieth-century changes relating to quartz and atomic standards. In contrast, what follows here documents for the first time who invented the electronic wristwatch and in what contexts they worked. Following engineers who worked simultaneously and independently in Japan, Switzerland and the United States, this story offers a comparative opportunity to show how local differences in culture, economy, business structure and access to technological knowledge shaped the design of finished products and their acceptance by users. This invention story is part of a larger study we have under way of the history of the electronic watch that will, we hope, offer important clues about how change happened in the late twentieth century, where it occurred and who controlled it.4
From a mechanical to an electronic world All watches work essentially the same way. They have a part that vibrates regularly (as the pendulum swings in a clock), a means for counting and displaying those vibrations and a power source. In a mechanical watch, an unwinding spring drives a train of wheels and causes a balance wheel to swing back and forth, usually at a rate of five times a second. Another set of gears, called the motion work, reduces the swings to rotate a pair of hands at a regular rate, the minute hand once in sixty minutes and the hour hand once in twelve hours. In an electronic watch, a battery provides the power to sustain the oscillations of a quartz crystal, which vibrates thousands of times a ~e c o n d .Circuits, substituting for mechanical gears, reduce these vibrations to regular pulses. The pulses can either drive a motor to rotate hands around a dial or translate into a numeric display.
For the watch to evolve from mechanical to electronic, its makers took many halting intermediate steps over roughly twenty years. In retrospect, there were clear signs already in the 1950s that watch manufacturers, in their perpetual pursuit of increasingly precise timekeepers, were eager to improve on the traditional mechanical wristwatch. T w o significant announcements inspired the industry to competitive research and development. In the early 1950s, word of a joint venture between the Elgin Watch Company in the United States and Lip of France to produce an electromechanical watch -one powered by a small battery rather than an unwinding spring -touched off an innovative wave. Although the Lip-Elgin enterprise produced only prototypes, a competitor, the Hamilton Watch Company of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, brought t o market in 1957 a workable electromechanical watch, powered by a tiny battery.6
Even more influential was the Bulova Accutron. Max Hetzel, a Swiss electrical engineer and outsider to the watch business, successfully substituted a tuning fork for the watch's vibrating balance wheel and, in this one insightful move, invented a timekeeper ten times more accurate than a well-adjusted mechanical watch. Paris, 19S7, We extend the story of the first electronic watches to include a more detailed study of Japan and the United States, where similar efforts were going on simultaneously. We cover some of the same territory covered by journalist Bob Johnstone in his account of modern technology successes in Japan, We Were Brrrning, op. cit. ( l ) ,61-144. Like Johnstone, we have conducted interviews with the participants to gather vital evidence that exists nowhere else. T h e material evidence of this invention story -the surviving body of prototypes, d n w i n g s and commercial watches -has also proved invaluable for informing this comparative investigation. Examples of the electronic watches discussed in this paper can be found in the History of Technology Division, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC.
5 The quartz is the watch's key precision element, and electronic watches containing a quartz oscillator are these days often called quartz watches. We use 'electronic' and 'quartz' interchangeably in this paper. automated manufacturing equipment for the company's facility in Biel. In 1952 company president Arde Bulova asked Hetzel to study the feasibility of the reported Elgin-Lip alliance to build an electric watch. Hetzel, who had learned what he knew about watches on the job, concluded from his research that the proposed electric watch would not be more accurate than any existing mechanical ones and suggested instead an acoustic frequency watch -one with a tuning fork oscillator. H e developed the first prototype in Switzerland in 1955 and then moved to Bulova's New York operation in Jackson Heights to work on a commercial product with William Bennett (Figures 1 and 2 ). By October 1960
Bulova had announced the Accutron to the world. Vibrating 360 times a second, the tuning fork reportedly provided precise timing to within a few seconds per day. Advertising trumpeted the new watch's accuracy and novelty -'It doesn't tick. It hums.''
The post-war global watch industry
The Accutron was a powerful catalyst. Its prospects stunned the watch manufacturing community, by that time a mature industry with a centuries-old global market and deeply entrenched patterns of manufacturing, marketing and sales. Simultaneously in Switzerland, the United States and Japan the earliest efforts to make an electronic watch began. Introducing electronics to this tradition-bound industry posed a difficult challenge. Local differences in culture, economy, business structure and access to technical knowledge greatly influenced how the quartz watch developed in these three different settings. What each development group had in common was men like Hetzel -innovative electrical and electronics engineers, not watchmakers -who would do everything differently.
T h e Swiss watch industry had momentum and market share. By the early twentieth century the Swiss had created an organized, horizontally integrated watch industry of collaborative companies. The Second World War served to increase Switzerland's dominance in the world watch market. While other countries halted their watchmaking to make way for military production, Switzerland continued making watches and exporting them around the world. After the war, renewed consumer demand pushed their industry to full capacity. By the 1950s the Swiss commanded over 50 per cent of the world market for watches.'
In contrast, by that time the once-proud American watch industry was in serious trouble. A hundred years before, Americans had taught the world how to make watches by machine. The Depression put many firms out of business completely and caused major reorganizations among the surviving firms. Hamilton absorbed the Illinois Watch Company, for example, and Benrus and Gruen were reduced to designing cases and assembling watches with Swiss movements. The Second World War gave Hamilton, Elgin, Waterbury and Bulova a brief boost with military contracts for marine chronometers and timing fuses for artillery shells. But after the war, American companies struggled to retool for peacetime and Swiss imports became a flood. T h e Swiss bought Elgin outright. By the 1960s Hamilton, Bulova and Timex were the only companies manufacturing watches in the United States9 Commttnity, 1854 -2998 , Waterbury, C T , 1998 . For more on the post-war American watch industry, see M . Cutmorr, Watches,1850 -1930 , London, 1989 Don Sauers, Time for America: Hamilton Watch, 1592 -1992 , Lititz, I'X? 1992 
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Timex emerged from post-war retooling to dominate American watchmaking and unsettle traditional advertising and retailing worldwide. By using year-round advertising, the firm undermined the convention that watches were special gifts reserved for Christmas and graduation. By selling their low-priced watches in a variety of retail o~itlets, including drugstores, Timex redefined retailing venues. Between 1962 and 1974 the firm's share of the American market rose from one third to nearly half.'" Meanwhile, in Japan, Seiko, a firm that had been in the timepiece business since the 1890s, was also busy with post-war rebuilding. The company set themselves a very ambitious goal -to challenge Switzerland's reputation as the makers of the world's most precise watches. Although Seiko mechanical wristwatches were placed only 144th at the industry-renowned time trials in Neuchitel, Switzerland in 1964, two years later three of the company's entries were placed in the top ten. During this time, production of watches in Japan doubled, while exports multiplied twenty-five times. By 1970 Seiko operated the world's largest watch company."
Electronic components
The components for the electronic watch emerged from independent streams of research that stretched back over nearly a century. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, scientists had identified new materials like liquid crystals, which eventually composed watch displays, and discovered properties like piezoelectricity, the phenomenon that permits a piece of quartz to vibrate regularly when subjected to an electrical current.12 During the Cold War, researchers in defence and aerospace technologies laid the basis for miniaturizing electronic circuitry. In the 1960s enterprising manufacturers applied the new research to the first electronic consumer products -televisions, calculators, hearing aids and watches.
At the heart of the historical transition is the story of how quartz became a timekeeping standard. Quartz vibrates regularly at thousands of times a second (more or less, depending on how it is cut and shaped). Electronic watches count those vibrations, divide them down to minutes, seconds and fractions of seconds, to show time on the dial or display. Quartz makes even the cheapest electronic watch many times more accurate than a wellmaintained mechanical watch.
In 1927 a quartz crystal first went into service as a timekeeper when Warren Marrison, a telecommunications engineer a t Bell Telephone Laboratories, developed a clock almost as big as a room that kept time using a crystal that vibrated a hundred thousand times a second when subjected to an electric current. Marrison's goal was not to invent a clock. He was in search of ways to monitor and maintain precise electromagnetic frequencies that carry radio and telephone messages. But he did realize the potential of his invention for improved timekeeping and proposed that quartz clocks be used in astronomical observatories to serve as time standards.13
In the 1940s observatories and scientific laboratories did in fact replace mechanical standards with quartz. Twenty years earlier, a new kind of mechanical timekeeper -the free-pendulum clock -had enabled scientists to prove that Earth does not keep uniform time. They showed that it speeds up and slows down as it orbits the Sun and wobbles on its axis as it spins-a day varies in length by tiny fractions of a second. Such deviations were immeasurable before astronomers could compare their celestial observations with free-pendulum clocks. And the deviations prompted the search for a new standard of defining the second. For centuries time had been defined in terms of the Earth's rotation relative to the Sun and other stars, and since early in the nineteenth century astronomers had defined the second as 1/86,400 of a mean solar day. Quartz clocks proved more accurate than any mechanical timekeeper, gaining or losing only a second in three years. In contrast the most accurate mechanical clocks might gain or lose three seconds per year.14 Although in Marrison's work quartz proved useful for large precision clocks, its advantages for personal timekeepers were not realized until engineers began investigating its possibilities for electronic watches. Before then, a crystal industry, born in the garage workshops of ham radio operators, had grown in the United States to machine natural quartz into appropriate shapes for frequency controllers in communications devices. T h e Second World War increased military demand for quartz oscillators, but supply shortages and difficulties with production techniques plagued the fledgling industry. After the war, manufacturers developed methods for growing synthetic quartz and new machinery for cutting smaller quartz oscillators, but it was not until the early 1970s, when Juergen Staudte invented a means of producing quartz oscillators using photolithography, that mass production became feasible.'.'
Almost as important as quartz to the electronic watch is the integrated circuit. Without tiny circuits, portable quartz timekeepers are impossible. In the quartz watch, the integrated circuit sustains the oscillations of the quartz crystal, divides the frequency down to one pulse per second and drives the display. 14 See, for example, the quartz standard built at the US Naval Observatory in the early 1930s, N M A H cat. no. 319994, and mechanical, quartz and atomic standards at the Royal Greenwich Observatory in Derek Howse, Greenwich Time and the Longitude, London, 1997, 163-80 . T h e Shortt free-pendulum clock, the most precise mechanical clock then available, was accurate to within plus o r minus ten milliseconds per day, according to J. D. Weaver, Electrical and Electronic Clocks and Watches, London, 1982, 35 . at Fairchild, the earliest integrated circuit solved a problem then troubling the computer industry, but its usefulness for watches was limited. Watch engineers needed integrated circuits with much lower power demands than these first circuits.'6 Just as the first electronic watches were in development, C-MOS (complimentary metal oxide semiconductor) circuits became available in the late 1960s. C-MOS circuits consume a hundred thousand times less power than ordinary chips because the current flows intermittentlyonly when the circuit switches from on to off, or off to C-MOS circuits were developed at RCA under the direction of Gerald Herzog, who was in search of ways to amplify audio signals. Funded by the Air Force and NASA, Herzog's team had prototype devices by 1964, and RCA began selling its first C-MOS circuits in 1967.l' Quartz watch engineers in labs around the world realized, when they learned about the new circuits with their low power demands, that they had the perfect solution for electronic watches dependent on small b a t t e r i e~. '~
The first electronic watches
The Accutron announcement spurred rival watch companies to develop competitive products they hoped would surpass the accuracy Bulova was claiming for its new tuningfork watch. Since the seventeenth century, when astronomers and navigators made demands for precision timekeepers, accuracy had long been the goal of clock and watch design. In more modern times claims t o greater accuracy had been the focus of watch advertising, especially for the Swiss. In 1960 the Accutron became the latest front-runner in the ongoing competition among watch companies.2')
In the ferocious global watch wars that ensued, only a few existing watch companies marshalled the resources to rise to the challenge. In the three cases that follow, firms cast about for alternatives to the Accutron's new precision, and in the end found themselves extending their traditional operations to accommodate the new electronics.
In Japan, Seiko had begun to explore the possibility of an electronic watch before any of its global competitors. The firm organized a team in 1959, led by Tsuneya Nakamura, to investigate the feasibility of a watch more precise than the best mechanical watch then ' it has always been the rule that the quality-of instruments of time measurement is a function of their precision. This was a point that had long been a feature of Swiss watch advertising, with its emphasis on chronometer certification by Swiss observatories. In making this assertion, Bulova was saying in effect that it was offering a better product -better than all but the very best of mechanical timepieces '.
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available." T h e project was a good match for Nakamura's ambitions. The young manager dreamed of creating the ideal watch-one that never stopped, never broke and was accurate and beautiful." Nakamura's group initially set its sights on developing a desktop quartz clock. And they had a deadline-Seiko had just been named official timekeeper of the 1964 Tokyo
Olympics. Just in time, the team developed a portable quartz chronometer for timing Olympic event^.'^ Their next goal was t o develop even smaller products. To design these watch prototypes, the ten-man team had to completely reinvent themselves. They were mechanical engineers desperately in need of electronics training. At that time in Japan, it was common for an employee to stay for his entire career with the same company. In turn, Japanese firms did not hire new staff with specific skills to work on new projects, they retrained their existing workforce. A company larger and richer than Seiko might have sent employees to American universities to acquire new skills, but Nakamura's team did not have that luxury.24 Driven by a desire to overtake the Bulova Accutron and the Swiss, these engineers zealously conducted exhaustive literature searches on oscillators, circuits and power sources. They did their research by trial and error.25
The engineering problems were many. Probably the greatest challenge was to develop a circuit that would divide the pulses of the vibrating quartz and drive the hands. Seiko's solution, in the days before appropriate integrated circuits were available, was a hybrid circuit composed of seventy-six transistors, twenty-nine condensers and eighty-four resistors, hand-soldered to the movement at 128 points.'G Their first commercial product, the Seiko Astron SQ, went on sale in Tokyo on Christmas Day 1969 (Figure 3) . It was the first quartz watch ever sold anywhere in the world. Some writers, alleging the watch was pulled off the market, deem the Astron a technical f a i l~r e . '~ But according to Seiko officials, the company never intended to make more than the initial two hundred pieces. Seiko management, regarding the Astron as only 21 Kohtaro Kuwata and Junjiro Shintaku, 'Business strategy for de-maturity: a case of Seiko in the watchmaking industry' (paper presented at the Mitsubishi Bank Foundation Conference on Business Strategy and Technological Innovation, Ito City, Japan, 13-15 July 1985), 12.
22 Recently retired, Tsuneya Nakamura rose to be president of Seiko Epson. His reminiscences on the quartz watch were given in an interview with the authors, Suwa, Japan, 24 June 1999. a first step in the development process, continued to support the research and development. Improved models soon followed.28
After decades of dominating the Japanese market, Seiko found it had to stretch to make much more accurate watches to compete with the Swiss in the world market. As Nakamura recalls, Japanese consumers were satisfied with Seiko's mechanical watches, and this complacent domestic market allowed the company to devote time and money to the quartz eff01-t.~F or these reasons Seiko was willing to take the risk on a new product that might ultimately be a technical or commercial failure.
In contrast to Seiko, the effort to develop a quartz watch in Switzerland did not happen within a single established watch company. T h e Swiss watch industry was horizontally integrated in hundreds of small companies. Only one or two of the firms at that time had the resources to tackle research and development independently, and they were not inclined to direct their efforts towards electronics.
In 1962 the president of the Swiss Chamber of Watchmaking, Gerard Bauer, had the Bulova Accutron on his mind. H e urged the establishment of a research laboratory in Neuchitel, the heart of the country's watchmaking district, to study the possibilities of alternatives to mechanical timekeeping. H e did so even though the Swiss watch industry already had a well-established research arm in Neuchitel, the Laboratoire Suisse de Recherches Horlogeres (LSRH -the Swiss Laboratory for Horological Research) near the campus of the city's university. For over twenty years, the LSRH had investigated problems in materials science, studied the physical behaviour of watch parts and surface treatments, developed atomic standards and distributed time frequencies, and taught advanced science to the country's promising young watchmakers. But Bauer foresaw a need for a real change of direction. The result was the CEH (Centre Electronique Horloger), funded by a reluctant consortium of shareholding Swiss watch companies and housed in the same building as the LSRH.30
Bauer's associate Roger Wellinger was in charge of hiring a staff for the lab. His challenge was to find well-qualified engineers. At that time the electronics industry and university training in the new field did not exist in Switzerland. Wellinger scoured companies in the United States, and American firms in Switzerland, for Swiss-born engineers with a background in electronics. The Swiss who became project leader was M a x Forrer, a Stanford Ph.D. physicist working at General Electric in California. He recalled how his initial scepticism at Wellinger's recruitment pitch ultimately turned to great enthusiasm. 'It was a high-risk affair', he remembers telling himself when he accepted the job, 'but if we were successful, it could be something a little bit e~t r a o r d i n a r y ' .~~ Once organized, the CEH staff faced scepticism and professional jealousy from the very traditional Swiss watch industry. T h e lab's shareholders were a great source of consternation for Forrer's team. Since the shareholders represented many companies, they had little interest in pursuing a unified goal. A number of the companies joined the consortium only grudgingly. T h e team worked in secrecy, lest one of their larger, richer shareholders learn how to make electronic watches and decide to abandon the CEH effort in favour of developing their own product. There were also plenty of critics who simply did not believe it was possible, or even necessary, to build an electronic watch.32
T h e most vexing technical problem they faced, according to another engineer, Henri Oguey, was the problem of developing components that could be integrated with each other into a system that would keep time. Swiss-born Oguey, who had previously worked at IBM in both Zurich and New York, recalls, 'the problem was to consolidate the needs of electronics with the needs of mechanics'. He described how the lab staff set to work on two different prototypes, with two different kinds of motors to drive the gears that turn the watch hands, each with its own peculiar circuit. With this public performance, the quartz watch was still far from a reality. Seiko's Astron was still two years away, and the CEH engineers returned to their lab to develop a commercial product, a process that took three more yearsz5
Forrer's team was frustrated with the slow pace. Manufacturing had to be distributed among the shareholding companies, several of which took their time to respond. All-new production lines had to be created, and staff at each facility needed training. One thousand watches had to be completed before any announcement of the product could occur. Finally, in 1970, watches containing the Beta 21 electronic module, descendant of the Beta 2 prototype, went on sale under the brand names of sixteen different Swiss watch companies (Figures 4 and 5) .36
The Swiss effort to invent an electronic watch was risky and unconventional. As the electronic watch project began, Swiss mechanical watches dominated world markets, and excellence in watchmaking was a large component of Swiss national identity. From their position of market strength, and with a national watch industry organized broadly and deeply to foster mechanical watches, many in the industry thought that moving into electronics was unnecessary. Forming a consortium was an established method for addressing needs in Switzerland and in the horizontally integrated watch industry. But the forming of the CEH brought tensions to the industry and obstacles to Forrer's team, obstacles that delayed the Swiss from having the world's first quartz watch for sale. For a group of electronics engineers to change centuries of tradition was indeed revolutionary.
By American standards, the Japanese and Swiss efforts to invent an electronic watch were unconventional in their approach to acquiring capital and technical knowledge. In contrast, the experience at the Hamilton VC ' However, Hamilton's quartz analog project was short-lived. It soon became clear to Hamilton developers that both Swiss and Japanese quartz analog watches were about to hit the market, well before Hamilton could have a product ready. In need of something completely new to stay competitive, Hamilton changed course to try to build the world's first electronic digital watch.
T o produce this digital watch Hamilton joined forces with a Dallas electronics company, a spin-off from Texas Instruments called Electro-Data, and moved John Bergey from its military products division to the watch division to head the team that would develop a digital watch. With a degree in engineering from Pennsylvania State University, Bergey had gone to work at Hamilton after three years in the US Air Force. He joined project engineer Richard Walton, who had come to Hamilton to debug the electric watch and then moved to the recently abandoned quartz analog project. In the midst of their development work, George Thiess at Electro-Data approached Hamilton to market his own product -a digital watch with an LED (light-emitting diode) display. Hamilton believed it could get its new watch to market more quickly with help from Electro-Data, and they soon signed a contract for Electro-Data to produce six prototype^.^' Electro-Data's design for the watch was problematic and it took over a year to build. Walton made frequent trips to Garland, Texas to check on the progress that Electro-Data's electrical engineer Willy Crabtree was making. Walton remembers that Crabtree and Thiess developed a leaky 4-volt wet cell battery that burned his wrist. 'It became a badge of honor to have this red mark on your wrist', VC'alton recalled, 'because it meant at one time you wore one of the prototypes'. T h e six prototypes were finally completed, and on 6 May 1970 a press conference in New York announced the Pulsar to the world. No dial and hands for this space-age gadget. Red numbers flashed the time at the push of a button.4" Developing a viable watch began right after the press conference. T h e watches unveiled there were still cranky prototypes that failed to work most of the time. Since the prototypes were composed of many circuits wire-bonded by hand, the design was far from ready for economical manufacturing. A single-chip module took two more years to get to market.
Components came from a variety of suppliers-RCA provided the C-MOS chips, Monsanto the LED displays and Clark Crystal the quartz oscillators. When consumers could finally purchase the Pulsar in 1972 the watch cost $2100 -the price of a small car (Figures 6 and 7) .41 appeared in 1983 they had just fifty-one parts, far fewer than any other analog quartz watch. Major investments in automated production processes lowered manufacturing costs. The ultimate throwaway watches, the new Swatches were sealed into plastic cases and deliberately designed to be irreparable. Recovery for the entire reorganized industry began with the Swatch, and Switzerland is once again the world's leading watch exporter in terms of total By the late 1970s first Japan and then Hong Kong firms overtook the Americans and the Swiss by manufacturing more, ever cheaper, quartz watches. These companies ignored traditional marketing methods long established in the watch industry, which had included selling watches only through jewellers, creating product lines in established price niches and building brand-name recognition. With a whole new line of products that in no way resembled traditional watches, Asian manufacturers threw the entire relationship between makers, buyers and sellers into disarray. Concentrating on low-end modules that cost pennies to make, by 1978 Hong Kong exported the largest number of electronic watches worldwide.46 T h e American watch industry was irreparably damaged. US semiconductor companies pulled out of the watch market entirely. With the sole exception of Timex, the few remaining traditional watch companies went out of business and sold their brand names to foreign competitors.
While the semiconductor companies' actions and cheap labour in Asia greatly contributed to the reorganization of the worldwide watch industry, consumers helped shape the way quartz watches were subsequently designed. T h e first watches were sold as luxury products for men. They were indisputably the most accurate timekeepers ever available to consumers. But the technologies they used were still experimental, and the watches unreliable. As prices dropped, quality did not necessarily improve. In the United States, customers returned faulty watches in record numbers. The return rate for digital watches in 1976, for example, was 30 percent.47
Sustained interactions between watch designers and watch users brought significant changes to the ultimate product. Consumers had a list of complaints they found particularly vexing. Extremely short battery life was at the top. In the early 1970s, batteries were relatively large, electronic circuits were power-hungry, and watch cases were bulky to accommodate the module. Consumer disapproval prompted the development of smaller batteries and forced manufacturers to find new ways to make extremely low-power circuits and displays. By the mid-1970s watches could run on smaller batteries, the cases shrank in size and manufacturers could offer models targeted to women buyers. In addition to battery problems, in the earliest models the quartz oscillators were extremely sensitive to hard knocks. Techniques for encapsulating the crystal and protecting it from shocks had to be developed. Moisture was also the enemy of electronic components, and waterresistant case designs became a priority.4*
